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This paper argues that the relation between law, science and technology cannot be understood without 
taking into account a number of intervening factors, identifying which makes it necessary to approach 
the question from the standpoint of disciplines other than law and science themselves. Understanding 
this relationship would help us to explain why the law takes some scientific and technological 
advances into account while discounting others.  
I present three such intervening factors, namely (a) paradigm shifts, (b) socioeconomic consequences, 
and (c) public debate, which I package into a model that brings out their interrelations: the more a 
particular technology goes through the stages described by these factors, the likelier it is to become the 
subject of regulation by law. 
In the second part of this paper I address the role that law plays once a public debate on specific 
technology is underway: I postulate the view that the law seeks as far as possible to retain its old forms 
in implementing the view or policy forged, tending to pour new wine into old bottles rather than find 
new bottles for the new wine. A number of reasons account for this, but the one I focus on is law’s 
specific mode of reasoning, that is, law reasons from analogy and metaphor, tending to preserve 
continuity with the past rather than breaking with it. I illustrate these ideas with the help of different 
cases related to IT law, in particular patent law and copyright law as they evolved in the US.  
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Like enemies cast in a lifeboat, the realms of technology and law 
     are forced to face each other, despite their differences  
in pace and intention. (Karnow 1997, 2) 
 
Introduction 
The basic thesis of this paper is that the relation between law, science and technology cannot be 
understood without taking into account a number of intervening factors, identifying which makes it 
necessary to approach the question from the standpoint of fields and disciplines other than law and 
science themselves. Understanding this relationship would help us to explain why the law takes some 
scientific and technological advances into account while discounting others.  
There are three intervening factors I present in Section 1 which enter and mediate between law 
and science: (a) paradigm shifts, (b) socioeconomic consequences, and (c) public debate. The first 
factor involves a philosophical discussion (section 1.1); the second, as its label suggests, is a matter to 
be investigated through a study in economics and sociology (section 1.2) ; and the third factor, public 
debate, I understand as debate such as you see unfolding on the political stage, and that would 
properly involve a study of politics (section 1.3). The three factors in question are purposely broad and 
subject to interpretation: they need to be applied to the case at hand—to the specific technology in 
question—to understand what they mean and what role they play in framing that technology’s relation 
to law. 
Having identified these three factors, I package them into a model that brings out their 
interrelations. And while I do not pretend this is an empirical model, I do believe that the more a 
particular technology goes through the stages described by these factors, the likelier it is to become the 
subject of regulation by law. 
In the second part of this paper (Section 2) I address the role that law plays once the 
technology has reached the final stage of this model, namely once a public debate is underway: then 
the need is clear to think about how the technology in question ought to be regulated. A solution needs 
to be forged, offering a way to harmonize all of the competing interests, claims, and values at stake. 
What happens in this process, or how it unfolds, is something I work out in Section 2.1 by considering 
science in two roles that have been ascribed to it: (a) as research science, where the technology in 
question is first developed; and (b) as regulatory science, once the technology has made its way into 
the public debate, and law invokes science as a source to look to in understanding the new 
phenomenon as it relates to society. These two roles may be concurrent, but regulatory science does 
not come into play until (i) after research science has introduced a paradigm shift with social 
consequences and a public debate and (ii) lawmakers and policymakers have invoked it. 
The input of regulatory science, and all the voices emerging from the public debate, then enter 
the public forum, where different views compete to decide on what the best way to regulate the new 
phenomenon might be (section 2.2). The law, or rather the people who make law and design policy, 
need not respond coherently in the process—especially since they all participate as both players and 
umpires in this game, which takes place in the public forum—but eventually something like a policy 
takes shape: the law takes this multiform input (heeding many concerns, none of which can be said to 
prevail over others in any definite way) and forges out of it a shared view, or a policy, under which to 
regulate the phenomenon in question. 
One important feature that can be observed in this dynamic is the inertia law retains as an 
essentially conservative institution. That is, I postulate the view that the law seeks as far as possible to 
retain its old forms in implementing the view or policy forged in the crucible of debate, tending to 
pour new wine into old bottles rather than find new bottles for the new wine. A number of reasons 
account for this, but the one I focus on is law’s specific mode of reasoning, that is, law reasons from 
analogy and metaphor, tending to preserve continuity with the past rather than breaking with it. I 
illustrate these ideas with the help of different cases related to IT law, in particular patent law and 
copyright law as they evolved in the US.  
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But before we begin, I premise this discussion by briefly clarifying what I mean by the terms 
law and science and technology. Law will be understood in a strict sense as the body of written law—
both statutory and case law, plus rules and regulations—as it pertains to a given subject matter. But 
since some of this law may be dead letter, and since the law is otherwise on the books because it needs 
to be applied, I will also refer to law in a broader sense as inclusive of the interpretive activity that 
surrounds it. Thus, Ross spoke of the law as “an abstract set of normative ideas which serve as a 
scheme of interpretation for the phenomenon of law in action” (Ross 2004, 18). And Gray referred to 
it as a set of “rules which the courts [...] lay down for the determination of legal rights and duties” 
(Gray 2009, 82). 
The terms science and technology, for their part, are typically used in combination. The 
distinction between them is roughly that between theory and practice, technology being the use and 
application of what scientists discover. This means that it is impossible to think about a technology 
without thinking about underlying scientific theories and assumptions (or at least a technology that 
brings those theories and assumptions into play), entailing an “inextricable connection” (Tallacchini 
2009, 274) between the two terms of the relation. So, as much as an intuitive distinction can be drawn 
between the two terms, science will be understood as inclusive of both science and technology (since I 
am less concerned with science as a set of theories about the world and more concerned with it as the 
activity of making useful discoveries) and technology will be understood as the employment of science 
for a useful purpose. Hence the close bond and interconnection between them. 
 
1. The Three-Factor Model 
As I have already mentioned, the basic idea behind the three-factor model is that a new scientific or 
technological development is more likely to come up on the radar screen of the law according to the 
extent that (a) it introduces a new paradigm in its area of research; (b) it carries socioeconomic 
consequences, or at least it threatens to do so, unsettling the established order; and (c), as a result, it 
gives impetus to a public debate originating within society at large and escalating to a public and 
political level, where finally it may find a point of contact with the law. So, in summary, the idea is 
that the more a technology does these things, the likelier it is to come under the purview of the law.1 
The three factors in question are purposely broad and subject to interpretation: they need to be 
applied to the case at hand (to the specific technology in question) to see what they mean and what 
role they play in framing that technology’s relation to law. Of course, I do not pretend my scheme to 
be a general rule. And in fact there have been cases where law has come into play before any 
socioeconomic consequences or public debate ever had a chance to take place. The law might act in 
this preventive role because the earlier it intervenes—that is, before the onset of any socioeconomic 
consequence or public debate—the more effective it will be at shaping the new technology in keeping 
with public policy, while the technology is still pliant.2 
Another feature of the three-factor model, is that its three constitutive factors—new paradigm, 
socioeconomic consequences, and public debate—come into play in that order. Hence, conceivably, 
there can be no social consequences without the technology first introducing a paradigm shift, nor can 
there be a public debate about something that entails no social consequences. Having said that, we can 
now take up the three factors in turn. 
 
                                                     
1 This idea is not new. In fact, I consider it to be something of a truism. Bennet Moses (2006, 509), for instance, has put 
forward the similar hypothesis that the more people are affected by a technological advancement, the more will this 
increase a general public awareness of that technology, and the more urgent will be the need for political, legal, and 
professional institutions to respond. 
2 One instance in which this early intervention seems particularly called for is when the technology in question seems to 
attack a core human value. Thus, the law stepped in early to ban human cloning, before the procedure could ever be 
carried out, since such a practice would clearly undermine human dignity, as well as equality among humans, the sanctity 
of human life, and the values revolving around the ideas of a family. As much as (to the best of my knowledge) no 
human being has ever been cloned, the very idea of such cloning has been reason enough for it to be prohibited under the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights and the United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning. 
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1.1. First Factor: Paradigm Shift 
I will not be concerned here with scientific and technological developments as such, or how they come 
about, because that would involve us in a number of epistemological issues falling outside the scope of 
this discussion. My focus is rather on the consequences of a new scientific or technological 
development, especially as these consequences may travel beyond their own native field of study and 
spill over into other fields, and even into society as a whole. Central to such an account will be the 
idea of a paradigm shift. 
Before we proceed any further in this account, I will thus lay the groundwork for this 
construction by presenting two related theses. First, I stipulate that in order for something to become a 
new paradigm, it must be significant enough to have consequences. This makes paradigms different to 
simple innovations: when we innovate, we improve or perfect something within an existing paradigm; 
in a paradigm shift, by contrast, we step outside the current paradigm and move into uncharted 
territory, and that means we are thinking “outside the box,” as the expression goes, literally outside the 
old paradigm. Whence the consequences inherent in, or necessarily entailed by, a new paradigm. 
I further stipulate that a paradigm shift is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for these 
consequences to take place: necessary because anything less meaningful than a paradigm shift is only 
a refinement of the prior art, and so by definition it cannot do anything more than what the prior art 
has done.3 At the same time, though, while paradigm shifts are necessary for any consequence outside 
their native scientific domain, they are not thereby sufficient to bring about such broader 
consequences.4 
With these two stipulations in place, we can illustrate what the full paradigm cycle would look 
like with its consequences extending beyond science and into society, thereby rolling out the entire 
three-factor model. We start with a new paradigm in a given scientific or technological field, and by 
definition this new paradigm will cause that field to “reprogram” itself (first factor): this reframing of 
theory and practice within a scientific field we might call an internal consequence, because we are still 
within its place of origin. Now, if we assume that this new paradigm is significant or perturbative 
enough to extend beyond these boundaries, it will first affect related disciplines and will then spill 
over into society at large (second factor), whereupon it will set in motion a public debate (third factor). 
However, the three-factor model does not necessarily work itself out completely, and for this 
reason we are first going to consider what the paradigm shift is.  
 
1.1.1. Kuhn and the Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
As we know, it was the philosopher Thomas Kuhn who introduced the term paradigm shift (Kuhn 
1962) as a device by which to distinguish science from nonscience: his initial interest lay in 
distinguishing physics from the social sciences. He noticed that, while physicists widely agree on the 
main problems to be investigated, the methods to be used, and the research directions to be followed, 
social scientists are very much at odds with one another in all three respects, failing to agree on the 
important issues, the proper methods, and the direction of future research. In physics, then, scientists 
are focused on certain issues, which are studied in certain established ways, and the discussions regard 
the results more than the methods by which to achieve them. In the social sciences, by contrast, results 
do not matter anymore than the issues themselves, and in fact everything is open to question, not just 
the issues worthy of study but also the methods by which to study them and the results achieved. This 
discrepancy between two fundamentally different ways of doing research and facing scientific 
challenges is one problem which Kuhn set out to investigate and explain, and to solve which he 
advanced his theory of scientific revolutions with its component idea of a paradigm shift. 
                                                     
3 Note that this does not rule out socioeconomic consequences and a public debate owed to sources other than a new 
paradigm. This is because it is specifically as a scientific construct that a paradigm acts in this role. So, while the idea of 
paradigms can be extended to fields and areas of activity beyond the scope of science, it is only as part of a scientific 
undertaking that in the three-factor model a new paradigm acts as a necessary condition of socioeconomic consequences. 
4 This is because (a) paradigm shifts are an intuitive notion, thus open to interpretation, and (b) this is not an empirical theory 
of social change, which is to say that the three-factor model is precisely that, a model, and not a predictive, testable 
account with law-like statements. 
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Another such problem was to explain how it is that scientists at any one time can believe 
claims and theories that later turn out to be manifestly false. For example, how could scientists once 
have believed that the earth was propped up by three elephants? Were these scientists less clever than 
scientists after Galileo? How could subsequent generations of scientists observe the same things as the 
previous generations and see things differently? 
Kuhn saw a parallel between the two problems at issue—that of the social sciences versus 
physics, and that of the patent erroneousness of past scientific beliefs—and found the key to both of 
them in what he called a paradigm. He observed that scientists and researchers work in communities, 
and that each such community works within a shared complex of basic assumptions, beliefs, attitudes, 
and methods: each such complex makes up a research paradigm,  and paradigms mark the passage 
from the scientific beliefs of the past to those of the present. He explains this shift in narrative fashion 
by drawing a distinction between “normal science” and “revolutionary science.” Normal science is 
described by Kuhn as a puzzle-solving activity, meaning that there is a basic framework within which 
scientists operate: there is a problem to be solved (the puzzle), and there is a solution to be found, 
following certain established rules. The whole of a given science is thus set up as a cumulative 
enterprise, or as a big jigsaw puzzle that scientists work at to gradually compose, piece by piece, 
identifying these pieces and putting them in the right place. Once every while, however, the scientists 
come upon an odd piece that cannot find a location, so these pieces are set aside as anomalies and do 
not make it into the big picture. But in time, as more and more of these anomalous pieces crop up, the 
scientists will begin to take a second look at their puzzle, and in so doing they will discover a puzzle 
within the puzzle: this realization sets the stage for the emergence of revolutionary science. A tension 
emerges as scientists find that the two puzzles bear little resemblance to one another: the older puzzle 
and the newer one—normal science and revolutionary science—cannot be made to cohere, so much so 
that Kuhn describes them as incommensurable and it is in virtue of this incommensurability that a 
crisis is provoked in normal science, with some scientists supporting the new science and others 
rejecting it, arguing that the correct puzzle-solving technique rests with normal science. But if more 
anomalous (or incommensurable) pieces come in and pile up, scientists will increasingly feel that such 
evidence can no longer be ignored and will accordingly set out to compose a new puzzle by which to 
explain the anomaly. This new puzzle—the revolutionary science making up a new paradigm—thus 
emerges from the breakup of the old puzzle (normal science within the old paradigm), and with this 
new puzzle comes a new agenda for scientists: consensus will build around a new set of problems and 
methods, at which point the new paradigm will have established itself and will persist until a new 
crisis sets in (as new anomalies mount), calling into question the old establishment and requiring a 
new way of thinking (a newer paradigm still). 
The scientists supporting the new paradigm will also agree on what this paradigm entails for 
their field of research. This agreement or consensus of the scientific community serves as a criterion 
by which to distinguish scientific disciplines from nonscientific ones: where no such community-wide 
consensus exists, there you have a nonscientific discipline; consensus around a single research 
paradigm, Kuhn observed, is specific to the hardcore sciences, and he thought this was not 
incidental—there must be a reason for it—so the presence of an agreed paradigm became for him a 
litmus test, on the  basis of which to class physics as scientific and philosophy, linguistics, law, and 
sociology, among many other disciplines, as instead lacking scientific status.  
However, my interest in Kuhn’s idea of a paradigm lies not in its use as a device by which to 
distinguish one discipline from another but in the use we can make of it to explain how theories and 
ideas change over time. I therefore extend the idea to see how it applies to the relation between science 
and society. 
 
1.1.2. Kuhn’s paradigms in the Three-Factor Model 
 I will not be concerned here with scientific and technological developments as such, or how they 
come about, because that would involve us in a number of epistemological issues falling outside the 
scope of this discussion. My focus is, rather, on the consequences of a new scientific or technological 
development, especially as these consequences may travel beyond their own native field of study and 
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spill over into other fields, and even into society as a whole. Central to such an account is the idea of a 
paradigm shift. 
Before we proceed any further in this account, however, the caveat must be introduced that 
paradigms and paradigm shifts are understood here to be intuitive concepts, not rigidly defined ones. 
This means, in the first place, that we must exercise judgment in deciding whether something counts 
as a paradigm or a paradigm shift; the entire construction being offered here is subject to 
interpretation, especially in view of the difficulties involved in finding consensus on what counts as a 
paradigm or a paradigm shift. And, in the second place, the intuitive nature of the concept of paradigm 
means that the construction built around this concept will likewise be intuitive. 
At the same time, though, intuitive should not be taken to mean “vague and formless.” I will 
thus lay the groundwork for this construction by presenting two related theses. First, I stipulate that in 
order for something to become a new paradigm, it must be significant enough to have consequences. 
This makes paradigms different to simple innovations: when we innovate, we improve or perfect 
something within an existing paradigm; in a paradigm shift, by contrast, we step outside the current 
paradigm and move into uncharted territory, and that means we are thinking “outside the box,” as the 
expression goes, literally outside the old paradigm. Whence the consequences inherent in, or 
necessarily entailed by, a new paradigm. 
I further stipulate that a paradigm shift is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for these 
consequences to take place: necessary because anything less meaningful than a paradigm shift is only 
a refinement of the prior art, and so by definition it cannot do anything more than what the prior art 
has done.  At the same time, though, while paradigm shifts are necessary for any consequence outside 
their native scientific domain, they are not thereby sufficient to bring about much broader 
consequences. This is because (a), as pointed out a moment ago, paradigm shifts are an intuitive 
notion, thus open to interpretation, and (b) this is not an empirical theory of social change, which is to 
say that the three-factor model is precisely that, a model, and not a predictive, testable account with 
law-like statements. 
 
1.2. Second Factor: Socioeconomic Consequences 
The three examples just made illustrate the interconnectedness between the three factors making up 
the three-factor model being fleshed out in this discussion. This means that, while these factors can 
each exert their own independent force on the law, it is only in combination that they come to fruition 
and actually wind up calling the law into play. Thus, the first factor (paradigm shifts), may be a 
necessary condition for law to take notice of a new technology, but this move will not come into effect 
until the consequences entailed by that technology begin to work their way into the socioeconomic 
fabric of life and these consequences become a matter of public concern.  
The biotechnological paradigm introduced in agriculture illustrates this last point, since in 
changing the way we grow crops and produce foods, the biotechnologies have also prompted us to ask 
questions we had never thought about before: Is it safe to feed chickens with chicken meat and bone 
meal? Are genetically modified tomatoes good or bad? Will genetically modified crops help us fight 
world hunger? Aren’t we going against nature by genetically modifying animals for research? What all 
these questions have in common is that they are prompted by a deeper concern with the way the new 
technology in question may change our form of life, thus getting us to rethink the given. 
This concern with our form of life may seem remote and philosophical, something for the 
speculative mind to consider, but it is more earthbound than one might at first assume. Indeed, the 
discussion is deeply moral—involving the practical question of what to do—and we wouldn’t be 
relating a new technology to a form of life in the first place unless there was a question about human 
good and harm at stake in the new technology, thereby putting the moral question front and center.5 
And this material element (human good and harm) is by definition not trivial: it need not be abstract 
and far removed from where we are today. 
                                                     
5 The expression human good and harm is Philippa Foot’s (1981). It relates to the question of how to go about specifying 
moral subject matter as distinct from what is nonmoral. On Foot’s content-based approach, something becomes moral by 
virtue of its involving a material element (human good and harm), against a formal or a prescriptive element. 
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Thus, as we have seen, the biotechnologies—and I take this to be true of all technological 
advancements that come within the purview of the law—entail economic consequences as well as 
bringing economic opportunities. High-tech industries (such as pharmaceutics and ICT) account for 
23% of the total economy worldwide, and medium-tech industries (such as chemistry and 
transportation) account for 39% (OECD 2009, 7). This inevitably draws the attention of investors and 
governments. In the United States, for example, biotechnology is both an area of research and an 
industry, so much so that in no other area is there a more conspicuous effort to market and exploit 
scientific knowledge (Etzkowitz and Webster 1995, 485), with $25 billion invested every year in the 
technologies (more so than anywhere else in the world). It is no surprise, then, that economists predict 
that the 21st century will be the century of the biotechnologies (OECD 2009, 62). The private and the 
public sectors are both involved, and the amount of investment is reflected in the number of patents for 
biotechnological inventions issued worldwide. 
 
1.3. Third Factor: Public Debate 
It was noticed in the last section that the three factors in the three-factor model are interconnected, and 
this holds in particular for the second factor in relation to the third: socioeconomic consequences in 
relation to public debate. Which is to say that we do not just sit idly by and watch these consequences 
as spectators; instead, we engage in the process through which they happen, and we do so by staging a 
public debate, not all of us together on one giant stage, of course, but in the communities through 
which such change is experienced. Something becomes part of the national conversation not by virtue 
of an overarching coordinated effort, but through the many voices that spring up at the grassroots 
level. On the upside, this makes for a pluralist polity whose diverse makeup and many perspectives are 
all brought to bear in forging a public policy or in reaching a consensus. But this is never a smooth 
process, as anyone can bear witness who has seen a public debate make its way forward, or otherwise 
get stalled, in the various forums where such debates are staged, from national television to the town-
hall meeting. 
There are many ingredients that factor into the process, which depends on a delicate balance 
of forces, and two of them that figure prominently are what I would call interests, on the one hand, and 
concerns, on the other: both can take imperfect or degenerative forms—as special interests in the 
former case and fear in the latter—and can thereby seize up a public debate by distracting its 
participants from a concern with the common good. And as much as the democratic process is 
designed precisely with this end in view—that of forging and maintaining a conception of the common 
good, or of a general welfare—we know how long this process can take (for it is an organic process 
involving many voices) and how easily it can get derailed in the attempt to achieve its purpose. So, 
where the biotechnologies are involved, there are interests and concerns that drive the debate on the 
proper use of such technologies: our interest is that the biotechnologies be used to advance human 
welfare; our concern, that they may be used in such a way as to instead bring about adverse effects (as 
would happen if human cloning were allowed). So far, so good. But as was remarked a moment ago, 
there are many elements that go into the process, and any number of circumstances may contribute to 
throwing it off balance, by causing the focus of debate to narrow down to something less 
comprehensive than the common good. When this happens, interests become special interests, and 
concerns are magnified into fears. 
Regardless of how the public debate proceeds, however, the general rule applies whereby 
public awareness of a new scientific or technological development, and hence the public debate 
surrounding such a development, increases in parallel with the scale of the impact, or even the 
perceived impact, which the phenomenon is bound to have on society. And once a public debate is 
underway, law and politics are engaged in a complex multilateral process by which to forge a public 
policy, attempting, or at least purporting to attempt, to take everyone’s interests into account with 
respect to the technology at issue, at which point the policy so developed is made into law (unless it 
has otherwise gone through the courts). So, while connected with the two accompanying factors 
(paradigm shift and socioeconomic consequences), public debate is what finally enables a new 
technology to reach critical mass, as it were, and become a subject of regulatory activity. And it can 
also be observed in this regard, by way of a general rule, that this point of contact is more likely to be 
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established where the technology in question is a novel or emergent phenomenon (as is the case with 
ICT and the biotechnologies), for this is more likely to spark public debate: the technology will in this 
case “receive much more regulatory scrutiny than old-fashioned ones” (Huber 1983, 1025). 
I conclude here by noting with Tallacchini (2009) that the reason why science and technology 
become political in the manner just described is that, on the one hand, they play a key role as drivers 
of socioeconomic change, but at the same time they tend to draw forth a sort of public scrutiny. In fact, 
with Kuhnian scientific revolutions and the developments that followed, we have come to be much 
more ambivalent toward science: no longer is science simply regarded as a cumulative, evolutionary 
enterprise tending toward greater and greater knowledge, and hence as a force for positive change 
working for the greater welfare of all, nor do we espouse any more the scientist’s view that “any 
meaningful question can be answered by the methods of science” (Stanford 2009); instead, we have 
projected the fallibility of human knowledge onto science itself, so that we no longer view science 
indiscriminately as a force for good but as a potentially threatening or harmful activity. For this 
reason—that is, owing to this twofold status of science as an activity at once progressive and 
potentially baneful—public debate around science inevitably ensues. Science and technology 
necessarily invite broad discussion: they can no longer be “confined within the labs, and so they find 
themselves forced to make the entire world their domain of experimentation” (Tallacchini 2009, 273–
4; my translation). In this way, public debate becomes part of the very process of science, so much so 
that Justice Brandeis found as early as 1927 (Whitney v. People of State of California) that such debate 
is actually a political duty, insofar as the “the path of safety [from the harm which science may cause] 
lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies.” A continuous 
line can thus be traced from the lab to the law, and the medium through which the connection is 
established is public discussion, now viewed as an integral part of science and so as something that 
cannot be bypassed. 
 
2. Law’s Role in Shaping the Relationship between Scientific-Technological 
Development and Society 
As already discussed above, the kind of scientific-technological advancements we are interested in 
usually come within the scope of the three-factor model, stipulating (a) a paradigm shift, (b) 
socioeconomic consequences, and (c) a public debate, as factors enhancing the likelihood that such an 
advancement will become legal subject matter. But these dynamics—describing how law comes to 
regulate science and technology—cannot be fully grasped without considering the larger interaction 
between law, science-and-technology, and society. 
The law plays an important and multifaceted role in this complex relation. On the one hand it 
regulates the scientific and technological developments shaping their use and application to fit 
society’s needs, calm down its concerns and stop those who want to use the advancements only for 
their own benefit. One such case was the attempt Hollywood studios made to stop Sony from selling 
the Betamax video recorder. Such a recorder made copies of copyrightable works and thus infringed 
the rights of the copyright owners. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled that this device could also 
be used for purposes which did not infringe copyright and therefore the Supreme Court did not want to 
let copyright owners dictate the design of tools and instruments for copying or recording, as this would 
stop “the wheels of commerce”.6  This is only one example where the law stopped the attempt to shape 
technological development in a direction that led to the good of one industry but not to the benefit of 
the whole of society.  
But on the other hand, the law also takes part in shaping society to accept a certain direction of 
scientific-technological advancement as the best possible one for all of us. Granick (2007, 1) suggests 
that legal regulation has a role to “comport with the values and desires of the public and propose a way 
that individual interests could be better enshrined in public policy.” This is clear, for example, from 
the politics undertaken in the  regulation of In Vitro Fertilization: an individual’s wish for an offspring 
and technological advancements to satisfy it should not go against the common values of human 
dignity and human life. 
                                                     
6  Sony Corp. V. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).  
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In particular technology can change the law if it presents the legal system with the following 
premises (Bennet Moses 2006, 507): 
(1) the nature of the technology requires that the legal process ban it, or limit its practice: this 
happened, for example, with the technologies that enable human cloning;  
(2) technology creates new uncertainties, highlighting legal ambiguities: this is what happened 
to the requirement of “creativity” when the legislator decided to protect programs under the copyright 
law; 
(3) technology outdates the existing technological assumptions regulated by law: this is why, 
for example, multimedia works are subject to legal controversies as they possess the characteristics 
that the copyright law is based on, but at the same time defeats its conviction that it is impossible to 
unite different works in one;  
(4) technology presents the law with the cases that makes it over (under)–inclusive with 
respect to the particular technology: this is the case of the Virginia state law that prohibited the selling 
of not self-replicating body parts. This norm was foreseen to prevent the cases of selling kidneys, but 
In Vitro Fertilization expanded the domain of non-self replicating body parts by working out 
techniques to separate and maintain ova. Therefore, this norm also included ova, which obviously 
cannot be compared to kidneys. So, this law was considered to be over-inclusive and consequently 
amended in 1991. 
The technologies are brought under the purview of law by society, by individual groups, 
movements and organizations through the public debate: when the mores and conventions of society 
are modified or created anew by new scientific and technological events, the law reflects these 
modifications and changes, legitimizing a particular shape of technological advancements. And vice 
versa, it is society that is shaped by law once those mores and conventions find judicial and statutory 
form, and if law legitimizes or regulates their modifications or new updates, society is forced to accept 
these modifications and changes, and reorganize its order correspondingly.  
Granick (2007, 1) sees in the law’s attention to public debate caused by technological 
advancement “an underlying consent: what the public wants is what the public should have, with only 
narrow exceptions in the case of medical safety and the rare market failure.” I do not fully agree with 
this statement, as what the public wants is quite often not that clear to the public itself: the public 
wants tomatoes in December but does not agree to genetically modify them in order to make them last 
that much; the public wants free access to music online but whenever this access regards their own 
creation, the public changes its mind and asks for more complex Digital Rights Protection (DRM) 
systems and more severe punishments for their infringement; the public also wants to spend less time 
in traffic or travelling, but doesn’t want to think about the pollution they produce using aircraft; the 
public wants a better planet for the next generation, but doesn’t want to renounce the use of petroleum; 
the public also wants healthy babies but also questions pre-natal research on the fetus. This is why I 
see the public as contradictory and sometimes the law is the right tool to bring about more linearity to 
the public’s reasoning,  reminding it of the hierarchy of values our societies are committed to.  
But what science does the law base its shaping of technology and society on? Or rather 
whether and, if yes, how, does science change when it goes through my three factor model? Does it 
remains the same when it goes through all of the three factors? I will try to answer these questions in 
the following section where I introduce the distinction between regulatory science and research 
science, the former being the point of reference for law and the latter the point of reference for science 
itself, and I will explain how research science becomes regulatory science once it goes through my 
three factor model. 
 
2.1. Research vs. Regulatory Science 
What I am arguing is that when the law starts to pay attention to a specific scientific-technological 
phenomenon, the law does not look at the phenomenon’s original scientific-technological domain 
(research science) but looks at its socially shaped reflection (regulatory science).7 I am arguing that 
                                                     
7 The term “regulatory science” was developed by Sheila Jasanoff (1998, 76–7) where she describes it as “science used in 
policymaking” which purpose is to “produce ‘techniques, processes and artifacts’ that further the task of policy 
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law does not go to laboratories, it doesn’t go to hospitals, research centers, doesn’t introduce itself 
among the white-dressed chemists or nuclear physicians. Rather, it is inspired by the social dimension 
of science, the dimension that public debate had attributed it with: this is exactly what Tallacchini 
(2009, 271) brings our attention to, highlighting the tendency of law to progressively colonize new 
domains of social regulation, the domains which are defined by science and technology.  
So, following my three factor model and arriving at the last of them, that is a public debate on 
the issues that scientific and technological developments gave rise to, the first thing the law does is to 
look at the science: but what it takes into consideration is not the scientific knowledge as such (which I 
call research science) but the science already shaped by its social implications, modeled by 
stakeholders (such as industry) and “masticated” during the public debates (this science I call 
regulatory science).  
These two sciences are the two sides of the same scientific or technological advancement: 
when this advancement is making its way through the barriers of scientific defeasibility, testing and 
experimentation, it is a part of research science’s domain, while at the moment in which it steps out of 
the lab, and faces the vast number of applications in the real world, causing the changes in our way of 
living both in good and in bad, and provoking in us respectively enthusiasm and disagreement, then it 
becomes an object of regulatory science, and consequently an object for legal scrutiny. This idea is 
also reflected by Karnow (1997, 89) who observes this passage and argues that “transfer of technology 
from the defense, research and academic settings to the commercial and consumer contexts will pose 
interesting and difficult issues, both technical and legal.” In fact, this is what happens to technological 
advancement that leaves research science and enters to make part of regulatory science.  
What distinguishes research science from regulatory science is that the former’s focus is the 
search for the truth about certain possibilities or phenomena, while the latter’s is the search and fight 
for credibility: the social group that will prove to be most credible in the eye of the legislator, will 
influence the legal regulation. This is why each group tries to shape and model the scientific truth 
(research science) on the basis of a group’s framework of values and interests, working out their 
model of science (research science) and presenting it as the only one corresponding to the real state of 
things (that is the most credible).  
The difference described above between regulatory and research science also presumes the 
difference in roles that the scientists and technologists play in each of them: if in the latter the 
scientists represent certain and neutral knowledge of the scientific community (Tallacchini 2009, 274), 
in the former their knowledge becomes a part of scientific-political decision making where there are 
no certainties and neutrality.  
The prevailing version of regulatory science then we will find in the form of “prescriptive 
descriptions” (Tallacchini 2009, 274, my translation) that accompany numerous European and 
international legal acts under the word  “whereas”: these “prescriptive descriptions” then should be 
seen as a form of “protected truth which validity doesn’t depend on the scientific consensus” or, in 
other words, on research science. 
Bennet Moses (2006) has a similar idea: she argues that the law is not interested in the 
scientific-technological knowledge per se (that is research science seen as a development of “what you 
can know”) but in the conduct that that scientific-technological knowledge enables us to do (that is, 
regulatory science seen as the development of “what you can do”). In other words, law is not that 
interested in what we can know (research science) as the knowledge as such doesn’t have influence on 
others, but rather in what we can do with that knowledge (regulatory science) and therefore from a 
purely legal perspective, “how carefully the use of various technologies is monitored, is, as a rule, 
more important than the capabilities of the technologies themselves” (Etzioni 2007, 119). 
The idea of research science versus regulatory science is also reflected in Callon’s (1995) four 
models describing the dynamics of science: research science corresponds to his first two models, that 
describe science as a rational knowledge (Model 1) and as a competitive enterprise (Model 2). Both 
these models are governed by pure science and represented by scientists themselves, who raise the 
(Contd.)                                                                   
development.” I use this term in a slightly different way, highlighting its importance for legal regulations (which could be 
seen as a sub-class of policy development).  
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questions, discuss and argue, but none of this trespasses on the boundaries of the scientific domain. 
The passage from research science to regulatory science would require passing to Callan’s Model 3 
and addressing scientific development as socio-cultural practice, which involves not only academic 
and scientific actors, but also policymakers, industry, media and others. Here the research science is 
fragmented into socially or economically relevant and irrelevant issues. This process is also known as 
“politicization of expertise” (Martin and Richards 1995, 512), which means that scientific-
technological knowledge is fragmented by groups and each group selects the scientific-technological 
claims that support their arguments. This is how a new scientific construction would be built: this 
construction I present under the name of regulatory science, and this is the science that supports the 
law and on which legal decisions are built. These legal decisions then directly influence research 
science.   
 
2.2. Translation, or Pouring New Wine into Old Bottles 
We saw in the last section how law tends to regulate new technologies by relying on regulatory rather 
than on research science, this is an effort to balance and work together the interests of all those who 
stand affected by the socioeconomic changes introduced by such new technologies. We now take note 
of the larger aim involved here, that of promoting stable social relations. Indeed, law is widely 
recognized as an essentially conservative institution serving the function of ensuring stability through 
change. So in this section we are going to consider the way in which law plays this stabilizing or 
system-preserving function. Which is to say that, operating on a principle of legal inertia and 
economy, the law will, whenever possible, refrain from fashioning new rules and forms specifically 
tailored to the scientific-technological phenomenon in question, attempting to instead deal with such a 
phenomenon by bringing to bear its old rules and forms: borrowing a metaphor suggested by 
Lawrence M. Friedman (2005, xii), we might say that the law will tend to pour new wine into old 
bottles rather than find new bottles for the new wine. 
So, we have here a case involving the broad question of how to deal with new technologies, 
or, more to the point, how new technologies can be brought under the purview of laws designed to 
regulate the older equivalents of those technologies, or again how to preserve the rationale of a law or 
legal doctrine when the technology in question changes, in such a way that the background 
assumptions about the technology are no longer what they were when the technology was older. This 
is an example where we can observe the law’s role of ensuring stability through change, and the 
process is one that Lessig (2006, 160) calls “translation,” for it involves identifying the gist of a law or 
doctrine, its core value or principle, and determining how it applies to the changed circumstances 
brought about by the new technology in question. 
An example of a technology that has made it necessary to engage in this practice of translation 
is wiretapping. The two relevant cases here are Olmstead v. United States (1928) and Katz v. United 
States (1967), both of them heard by the Supreme Court.8 In Olmstead, the defendants were 
bootleggers who had been running one of the nation’s largest organizations of its kind, and they 
claimed that their right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution had 
been violated when the federal government tapped their telephones without a warrant (a court order 
giving a police officer permission to enter private property and search for evidence of a crime), 
arguing that the evidence so obtained could not be used in a court of law. The government objected, 
rebutting that no such warrant was needed, since there was no trespass involved in the wiretapping (no 
one entered anyone’s property during the investigation), and so the Fourth Amendment simply did not 
apply. So the issue before the court, namely, whether wiretapping without a warrant constituted an 
invasion of privacy, turned on the question of whether wiretapping amounted to trespass. 
Why does this involve translation, or pouring new wine (wiretapping technology) into old 
bottles (the protections afforded under the Fourth Amendment)? Because the constitutional protections 
in question, the Fourth Amendment protections against invasion of privacy, were framed at a time (in 
1791) when the technology for invading someone’s privacy was trespass. In other words, it was 
                                                     
8 For a fuller account of these two cases as they pertain to translation in the sense here specified, see Lessig 2006, chap. 9 
(“Translation”). 
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assumed by the framers of the Constitution that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” (such is the language of the 
amendment) was something one could violate only by walking into someone’s home and looking 
through their belongings. Wiretapping involves no such entry and so, the government argued, it could 
not be equated with trespass. 
Clearly, the question whether wiretapping amounted to trespass had to be decided in such a 
way as to preserve the meaning of the constitution, for this is the whole point of having a constitution 
in place, especially a rigid one subject to judicial review, as is the case of the United States 
Constitution (on which see Ferejohn 2002, 58).9 But how to do that? How to achieve such fidelity to 
the Constitution? Two competing strategies are available—one being translation and the other what 
Lessig (2006, 160) calls “one-step originalism”—and both can be found in Olmstead. 
In one-step originalism, fidelity is achieved by a strict construction of the statute or 
constitutional provision in question, that is, by a literal reading of the relevant language. In Olmstead, 
this meant “repeating what the framers did” (Lessig 2006, 161), and since the framers intended the 
Fourth Amendment to apply only to trespass, it follows that only trespass amounts to an invasion of 
privacy. Wiretapping therefore cannot be equated with trespass, and the government was accordingly 
within its rights to obtain evidence through that method. 
This is how the court wound up actually deciding the case, but there was a dissenting opinion 
written by Justice Brandeis, and this opinion took the view that Lessig (2006, 166) terms “fidelity as 
translation,” the aim being to “translate the original [Fourth Amendment] protections into a context in 
which the technology for invading privacy had changed” (Lessig 2006, 161). Brandeis acknowledged 
that the Fourth Amendment as originally written applied only to trespass, but he argued that (i) there 
was simply no way for the amendment to have any broader application, since there was no 
wiretapping technology available at the time of its framing, and consequently (ii) the protections 
provided under the amendment were strong ones indeed, severely limiting the government’s ability to 
carry out search and seizure, precisely because trespass was the only method by which to do so, and no 
trespass was deemed constitutional absent a warrant (or at least this had established itself as the Fourth 
Amendment doctrine by the time Brandeis was writing). So, if we wanted to keep the original 
protections in place, we needed to translate the original context of the amendment into its current one, 
and that required extending the scope of the amendment so as to cover wiretapping as well. On this 
view, then, fidelity to the constitution requires not repeating what the framers did, but finding its 
current equivalent: instead of maintaining the scope of the amendment, while diminishing its 
protections, you expand its scope so as to maintain its protections. 
This latter view, fidelity as translation, embraces the idea of a living constitution, one “that 
evolves in response to changing conditions” (Balkin 2005), an idea which William J. Rehnquist has 
ascribed to Oliver Wendell Holmes, and which can be characterized as the logical outgrowth of the 
general language in which the Constitution was framed: 
 
The framers of the Constitution wisely spoke in general language and left to succeeding 
generations the task of applying that language to the unceasingly changing environment in which 
they would live. [...] Merely because a particular activity may not have existed when the 
Constitution was adopted, or because the framers could not have conceived of a particular method 
of transacting affairs, cannot mean that general language in the Constitution may not be applied 
to such a course of conduct. Where the framers of the Constitution have used general language, 
they have given latitude to those who would later interpret the instrument to make that language 
applicable to cases that the framers might not have foreseen. (Rehnquist 2006, 402; italics added)  
 
                                                     
9 Compare Bognetti and Fellman 2006: “Constitutions, written or unwritten, must be distinguished according to whether they 
are ‘rigid’ or ‘flexible.’ Rigid are those constitutions at least some part of which cannot be modified in the ordinary 
legislative way. Flexible are those whose rules can all be modified through the simple procedure by which statutes are 
enacted. The United States has a rigid constitution, because proposals to amend the constitutional document adopted in 
1788 must have a two-thirds majority vote in each house of Congress [...]. Great Britain has a flexible constitution 
because all of its constitutional institutions and rules can be abrogated or modified by an act of Parliament.” 
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The italics in the passage just quoted serve to point out that this is where translation would have to 
intervene, where something develops in society which the original framers of the Constitution could 
not have foreseen, and which requires thinking about what they would have said had they in fact done 
so, in effect pouring new wine (a new socioeconomic development) into old bottles (into the general 
language of the Constitution), but in such a way as to remain faithful to the framers’ original intent. 
The development in question, where we are concerned, is wiretapping technology, and though we saw 
a failure of translation in that regard in Olmstead, that is precisely the view that wound up prevailing 
in a case which overturned Olmstead almost forty years later. 
In this more recent case, Katz v. United States (1967), the defendant, Charles Katz, had been 
convicted of illegal gambling on the basis of information that federal agents had obtained by planting 
an eavesdropping device in the phone booth he used to conduct his dealings. Katz challenged the 
conviction arguing that this amounted to an invasion of privacy, since the evidence used against him 
had been obtained without a warrant and therefore could not be used in court. So the facts of the case 
were analogous to those in Olmstead—they involved in either case a claimed invasion of privacy 
without physical trespass—but the rationale of the decision turned Olmstead on its head: it was found 
in Katz that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places,” and privacy so conceived (as 
protecting people rather than places) can be violated without physical trespass. The Fourth 
Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure were thus translated into a context 
where new technologies made it possible to “search” people in ways the original framers could not 
anticipate. The effect of the ruling in Katz was therefore to make the Constitution context-neutral, and 
more specifically “technologically neutral” (Lessig 2006, 165), through an interpretive practice of 
translation that preserves the meaning of the Constitution by taking into account the changed 
circumstances of its application (rather than by sticking to the letter of the law). 
The larger point of this illustration is that certain presumptions operate whenever a law or a 
legal doctrine or principle is framed, and that these presumptions change over time, thus making it 
necessary to consider the new context in which the law is to be applied. And this dynamic is not 
limited to wiretapping: it can be observed with respect to just about any technology across all areas of 
the law. Thus, (i) patents were created to protect mechanical and technical inventions for a twenty-
year period, but now it protects software, which becomes obsolete as soon as five years after 
inception, and there is also patent protection for genes (about 20 percent of all human genes have been 
patented by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)), even though patents were not 
conceived to cover products of nature or discoveries: there is no invention involved in isolating a gene, 
any more than there is in isolating the seed of a walnut from its shell.10 Likewise, (ii) copyright 
protects literature and creative work generally, but now it also applies to work that cannot essentially 
be defined by virtue of its being creative, namely, software;11 then, too, (iii) criminal procedure 
regulates the admission of evidence in court and is now dealing with the problem of deciding how to 
treat speech-recognition technologies in that respect; (iv) labor law, conceived to ensure decent 
working conditions and bring some stability in employer relations with trade unions, is now expanding 
its scope to cover new employment relationships born and carried out online, where the working 
conditions that trade unions have fought for are irrelevant; (v) data-protection law finds itself having 
                                                     
10 An example of this is the ruling handed down in March 2010 by a New York federal district court in a case filed against 
the USPTO in May 2009 by the ACLU and the Public Patent Foundation, seeking to invalidate as both illegal and 
unconstitutional two patents which the biotech company Myriad Genetics held on two human genes associated with 
breast and ovarian cancer, and the ruling came down on the plaintiffs’ side. Myriad Genetics is appealing the decision, 
but if it stands it will have significant implications for the biotech industry. The case is Association for Molecular 
Pathology et al. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office et al., and the opinion is available at 
http://thepriorart.typepad.com/files/aclu.v.myr I ad.opinion.pdf. 
11 It is not just lawyers who see parallels between software and literary works: some software engineers have argued that 
software “more closely resembles the temporal arts (music, literature) than the plastic arts (architecture, sculpture, 
painting). Software can be compared [...] to the text of a novel or poem, which has to be interpreted and performed.” 
Another parallel is that software “comes in different versions and is distributed to the end-users in plenty of identical 
copies. Also from this perspective software has something in common with artworks such as books” (Northover et al 
2008, 92–93). 
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to deal with issues emerging in connection with social networks, smart phones, and genetic research; 
(vi) contract law works on contractual frameworks for new types of goods and services; (vii) 
administrative law is devising schemes under which to set up e-democracy and e-government 
programs, all the while (viii) consumer-protection law is seeking ways to fight e-commerce fraud and 
deal with genetically modified foods; and, in an area similar to that previously discussed, (ix) the 
common law of trespass to chattels is being extended to cover trespass to intellectual property. 
This is just a sampling of the examples illustrating how new contexts and technologies force 
the law to revisit its own assumptions. Then, too, there are different changes these contexts bring 
about, and so different assumptions that need to be revisited.12 One such assumption is that of the 
boundaries between different areas of law. Take, for example, the longstanding distinction in the law 
of intellectual property between copyright (protecting works of authorship) and industrial property 
(covering inventions, trademarks, trade secrets, and industrial designs): this distinction has been losing 
force by a long process of attrition, and we can appreciate as much if we only consider the similarities 
that software bears to architecture work in this respect, in that both fall within the purview of 
copyright protection,13 yet both can be patented,14 meaning that they are at the same time treated as 
industrial property. This may have to do with the dual status of architectural works and software as 
artifacts involving both authorship (the realm of copyright) and invention (the realm of patent law). 
Indeed, architecture can easily be considered both a fine art and a useful art, so much so that these two 
sides are often thought of as closely bound up, indeed as inextricable: “Form ever follows function,” 
said the architect Louis Sullivan in 1896 (Sullivan 1957, 205), establishing what would become the 
basic credo of modern architecture and industrial design, and introducing a view of architecture as an 
art no less concerned with the beautiful than it is with the useful, or the functional, if not more so. And 
software, for its part, is regarded by the law as a piece of writing, because that is what code essentially 
consists in: software is accordingly protected under copyright, yet it is so protected ignoring that 
software code does nothing on its own until it is coupled with a piece of hardware to make it 
functional, or make it do something, which is its intended purpose and is the reason why it would 
logically make more sense to protect software under patent law than under copyright. 
This dual status of both software and architecture leads to all sorts of ambiguities. Thus, where 
architecture is concerned, we see that copyright protects (under the Berne Convention) both the 
building itself and its design (its plans and drawings), but it could be argued (Hooas 2006) that this 
defeats the essential point of copyright as protecting not the idea behind a work but its form of 
expression (the finished product itself). Or at least this is how we should reason if we take the building 
to be the concrete expression of a design idea expressed on paper (the blueprint), and if we assume 
that the finished product lies not in the plans for the building but in the building itself.  
The same sorts of questions can also be raised with respect to software: Doesn’t software 
code—chiefly protected under copyright, the realm of the creative—primarily serve the function of 
having a machine that will process data in a certain way? And isn’t this the essential reason why we 
write code to begin with? Granted, a piece of code may be considered creative for the way it goes 
about solving a certain data-processing or computational problem, but isn’t it primarily for this 
solution that we value such software? That is, do we not value code for what it does, or how well it 
works, rather than for its inherent beauty or elegance as a form of expression? Nor can the ambiguity 
of the distinction between form and content be confined to software and architecture alone: if 
copyright protects form, while patent law protects content, how come we can find inventions patented 
on the basis of their form? For we do have inventions based on the form of a propeller, a hull, a 
turbine, a lens, a container for liquids, and so on (on which see Frassi 1997, 335–68). So we have here 
                                                     
12 Cf. Bennet Moses 2006, 507, identifying four classes of problems with respect to the law’s ability to keep up with 
technological change: under one such heading she notes how “existing rules may be based on explicit or implicit 
assumptions about technological feasibility that are no longer reasonable.” 
13 Architecture does so under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886–1979). 
14 An example of patented architecture is US Patent 5761857, issued under the title “Lot configuration and building position 
and method for residential housing,” which describes “a unique residential or commercial building lot configuration, 
building position on the lot, and method for locating buildings on adjacent lots.” 
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a distinction on which hinges a core part of intellectual property law—since the question as to whether 
any creation of the mind is subject to copyright or to patent protection depends in large part on 
whether we are protecting its form or its content, its outward expression or its underlying idea—and 
yet little seems to fall neatly within this distinction outside the paradigm cases of literature, music, 
plays, and art, on the one hand, and inventions that do or transform something, on the other. 
 
2.2.1. Law as an Interpretive Enterprise 
What all this goes to show is that there is plenty of room for interpretation when it comes to applying 
the classic tests of copyright and patent protection. The originality standard in US copyright law seems 
pretty straightforward, requiring that a work be independently created (rather than copied from another 
source) and that it evince some degree of creativity; yet such creativity may simply consist of “some 
creative spark, no matter how crude, humble, or obvious it might be” (Feist v. Rural, 1991). It seems, 
therefore, that most anything counts as a creative spark, so long as we can see in it “the fruits of 
intellectual labor.” In Feist, for example, creativity was recognized for the way the facts in a public 
phone directory had been selected and arranged, and even though this only amounts to a “thin” 
copyright, protecting only such aspects of a work as are original to its author, it does show that the bar 
for creativity is set quite low. And the same goes for the originality requirement for software in the 
EU: under Article 1(3) of the EU Software Copyright Directive, “a computer program shall be 
protected if it is original in the sense that it is the author’s own intellectual creation. No other criteria 
shall be applied to determine its eligibility for protection.” 
The same sort of looseness can also be seen with respect to the machine-or-transformation 
requirement for patents, originally conceived for the mechanical inventions of the Industrial 
Revolution. This criterion applies not just to software but to a range of other technologies, too, such as 
pharmaceutics, the biotechnologies, and nanotechnology. One therefore has to ask, how can patent law 
still cover these innovations under the umbrella of its traditional concepts? For example, how does the 
“technical character” test used by the European Patent Office under Article 52(3) of the European 
Patent Convention apply to pharmaceuticals? Clearly, this can be achieved only by injecting a fair 
amount of interpretation into the legal requirements for something to become patentable subject 
matter. 
One might conclude at this point that interpretation serves as a legal expedient, a device the 
law finds itself compelled to resort to in its striving to come to grips with new technologies and make 
them consistent with existing law and mores. But I would suggest that interpretation is instead 
connected to law on a much deeper level, or that the basic concepts in any area of the law are 
deliberately general—hence deliberately designed to invite interpretation—because that is the strategy 
by which the law ensures its own coherence in the face of change, considering that the alternative, 
namely, a set of accurately defined concepts, would quickly commit the law to irrelevance. This seems 
to be a pervasive feature of the law, and in fact a parallel can be drawn here between intellectual 
property law and constitutional law, in that just as the building blocks of intellectual property are 
purposely broad (as in the example of the originality standard in copyright and the industrial-use 
standard in patent law), so is the language of the constitution purposely general. But in either case, the 
basic idea seems to be to have language sufficiently specific to be meaningful, yet at the same time 
sufficiently general to enable interpretation of the law when the circumstances of its application 
change. 
How specifically to deal with such change has been the subject of this section. We have 
stipulated that the law proceeds in this regard by a principle of inertia, such that when change does 
come about, making it necessary to interpret existing law, the tendency in law will be to pour the new 
wine into old bottles—this is what translation does—rather than to find new bottles for the new wine. 
Where intellectual property is concerned, the former strategy has been termed accretion (Lessig’s 
translation) and the latter emulation: 
 
Intellectual property may be extended to new subject matter either by accretion or by emulation. 
Accretion involves re-defining an existing right so as to encompass the novel material; emulation 
requires the creation of a new and distinct right by analogy drawn more or less eclectically from 
the types already known. (Cornish 1993, 54–55) 
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To see how the wine-and-bottles metaphor applies here, we just plug in the relevant terms (in square 
brackets), for which purpose we can just as well use Dutfield and Suthersanen’s (2008, 14) 
restatement of the idea: “when it comes to extending intellectual property to new types of creations 
[new wine], the options available to policymakers are to fit such products into existing intellectual 
property categories [into old bottles: accretion] or to create “new intellectual property rights [or new 
bottles: emulation].” In either case the process is interpretive, its basis being in particular one of 
analogy: in accretion we reason by analogy from an existing type of creation; in emulation, from an 
existing right. And even though in either case we wind up expanding the law, the idea is to keep the 
expansion consistent with existing law (that is why the reasoning proceeds by analogy), and we can 
thus see how this all goes back to the view (stated at the outset in this section) that while law does 
continually change, it seeks to do so in a stable way (that is, by making sure that the new is coherent 
with the old). 
An example where law reasons by analogy from an existing technology is where the courts 
have treated the question whether email meets the Statute of Frauds: indeed the court in JSO 
Associates, Inc., v. Price (2008) found that emails do meet the Statute of Frauds even when they are 
unsigned. In an earlier case, Rosenfeld v. Zerneck (2004), the question whether an email satisfies the 
Statute of Frauds was made to depend on whether the email bears a typed-in signature or an automatic 
signature block.15 And in yet another case, Vista Developers Corp. v. VFP Realty LLC (2007), the 
court emphasized that “the issue of whether an e-mail is ‘signed’ should turn not on the lack of a 
typed-in or inserted signature at the bottom, but on whether the language of the e-mail or procedures 
surrounding it sufficiently indicate intent. What these three cases have in common, aside from 
agreeing that emails can in fact satisfy the Statute of Frauds, is that they reason by analogy from what 
would hold for traditional writings on paper (traditional memorandums), sorting out on that basis 
which traits or elements of an email are relevant in deciding the issue at hand. 
 
2.2.2. The Role of the Courts 
This reasoning by analogy is just a shorthand way of saying that the law is always struggling to keep 
up with technological change by reinterpreting its own rules or devising new ones, all the while 
seeking to maintain a coherent system. There are different types of situations that might trigger such a 
response on the law’s part, and Karnow (1997, 6–11) groups them under four headings as follows: 
(1) Existing legal categories lose their force. This is what happened with the novelty 
requirement in patent law in the face of software-based and business method-based inventions. 
(2) The boundaries between legal concepts fade. We saw this earlier with the originality 
standard in copyright vis-à-vis the industrial-use standard in patent law, and the same goes for the 
distinction between public and private, for example: “there is disagreement on whether 
communications between computers is like public exchanges in a town square, or like a bookstore 
with a thousand books, or like a newspaper. But doctrines of free speech and other rules depend on 
which of these metaphorical structures is thought to prevail” (Karnow 1997, 7). 
(3) Existing legal concepts get eroded. An example here is liability when computer failure 
causes loss or injury: the more complex the computer system, and the more autonomous it becomes, 
the greater the difficulty in figuring out where the blame lies, or who is to be held accountable. 
Similarly, it becomes difficult to apply the concept of force majeure, since the boundary is no longer 
clear between what can be controlled (and hence with whom responsibility rests) and what cannot. 
(4) There are no shared assumptions. We have seen this already with wiretapping (where it 
can no longer be assumed that privacy can only be infringed by trespass), and e-mail (where it can no 
longer be assumed that an e-mail counts as a written memorandum under the Statute of Frauds). 
Another case is property in a Web-based environment, where there is no longer a shared assumption as 
to what counts as private property. 
                                                     
15 Though the court also found that even an email with a typed-in signature, while it shows intent to authenticate the writing, 




The reader may be aware from the discussion in the last section that it is not necessarily 
through statutory enactment that the law responds in its attempt to cope with these types of situations: 
the response may well go through the courts before reaching a legislature. In fact, there are reasons to 
suggest that this is actually a tendency of the law, more so than a matter of happenstance. That is 
consistent with the principle of inertia I have postulated for the law, or the law’s essentially 
conservative tendency, which I have explained by pointing out its inherent need to maintain a coherent 
system—stability through change, as the idea was previously expressed. But there are other reasons, 
too, that might explain this tendency, and one such reason has to do with an oft-cited virtue of 
common law, namely, its flexibility. Mann and Roberts (2010) attribute this quality to the basic 
working principle of common law, that of stare decisis (to stand by the decisions), “the requirement 
that courts follow their own precedents” (Emerson and Hardwicke 1987, 7). To be sure, this suggests 
not so much the idea of living law as that of law stuck in a groove by virtue of its own dead hand. But 
then 
 
Stare decisis does not [...] preclude courts from correcting erroneous decisions or from choosing 
among conflicting precedents. Thus, the doctrine allows sufficient flexibility for the common law 
to change. The strength of the common law is its ability to adapt to change without losing its sense 
of direction (Mann and Roberts 2010, 8).16 
 
This explanation of flexibility has also been pointed out by Bennet Moses (2006), who casts the 
argument in terms of what the best strategy might be when it comes to removing the uncertainty of law 
in the effort to “facilitate the law’s adaptation to technological change” (ibid., 508).  
This is an argument she supplements by noting in addition that what the courts find often goes 
hand in hand with what a legislature would enact: “if the common law solution is similar to that what 
have been enacted in any event, the flexibility of the common law is retained. In particular, the rule is 
likely to be more adaptable to future technological change” (ibid., 617). For this reason, among others, 
she advocates a “wait and see” approach in this regard, “observing the common law resolution of 
uncertainty and enacting a statute only if the resolution is undesirable or any residual uncertainty has 
undesirable consequences” (ibid., 616). 
The courts thus seem to have a useful role to play in enabling law to deal with the changes that 
develop as technologies advance: the courts’ ability to maintain the flexibility of law, all the while 
enabling the law to “hang together” and not lose its sense of direction, means that we can use the 
courts to test a solution before committing to legislative enactment. In other words, the courts’ 
interpretive activity makes it possible to test whether existing laws and legal concepts (our old bottles) 
can be used as containers within which to suitably accommodate the practices and forms of life arising 
in connection with a new technology (the new wine) or whether the challenge so posed makes it 
necessary to stretch our legal concepts and solutions to such an extent that they can no longer be 
recognized for what they are, at which point we know we may need to turn to legislation. Indeed, as 
Karnow (1997, 144) argues, “good solutions to problems of advancing technology are those that do 
not need repeated access to the courts.” 
So the idea here is to harness the law’s power as an interpretive enterprise—a power enabling 
us to see what works in the face of change—and it is for this reason that we turn to the courts. As 
Karnow (1997, 224) comments, “courts that concede the power of the past to judge the present will 
help us understand that present and to put it into a context.” The courts, in other words, help us 
understand the meaning the past has for us today. This is the stuff of translation as previously 
discussed: we are dealing here with an interpretive practice at once conservative, because the effort is 
to “preserve context and meaning” (ibid.), and transformational, because we want to do so in such a 
way as to welcome and make sense of the new. 
                                                     
16 A statement very much in the same vein can be found in the decision that Justice McCardie rendered in the English case 
Prager v. Blatspiel, Stamp and Heacock Ltd. (1924): “The object of the common law is to solve difficulties and adjust 
relations in social and commercial life. It must meet, in so far as it can, sets of fact abnormal as well as usual. It must 
grow with the development of the nation. It must face and deal with changing or novel circumstances. Unless it can do 
that, it fails in its function and declines in its dignity. An expanding society demands an expanding common law.” 
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These two facets of law as an interpretive practice (the conservative and the transformational) 
can both be rendered through the old-bottles metaphor because, even when a new technology is 
brought within the scope of old legal categories, the latter will nonetheless have to be stretched to that 
end, at least most of the time. For this reason I would distinguish a transformational interpretive 
practice (where we are still reasoning within the bounds of existing categories) from a transformative 
one, where we need to introduce new forms and categories, the overall stipulation being, as before, 
that law tends to pour new wine into old bottles (new technology into old legal categories) but will 
find new bottles for such new wine when the old bottles no longer do. The law’s way of dealing with 
change, in other words, is to take a conservative attitude, so far as that proves feasible, after which 
point (when the change in question can no longer be accommodated within existing concepts) a 
transformative or category-changing (and hence creative) move will be triggered. Although there is no 
way to predict when that will happen, or under what specific circumstances,—the three-factor model 
attempts to frame the setting where that happens but is not intended as a predictive account—there is 
no denying that this is generally what happens, or that these are the basic mechanics of the law’s 
response to technology. 
The conservative mode of response can be observed in two cases involving the patentability of 
life forms. The first of these cases is Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980), where the United States 
Supreme Court found that a bacterium capable of breaking down crude oil (for use in treating oil 
spills) is patentable subject matter under Title 35 of the United States Code, Section 101 (“Inventions 
Patentable”): No legal significance attaches to the fact that the thing for which a patent is sought 
happens to be alive; what does instead have to be established as legally relevant is that we are dealing 
with “a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter—a product of human 
ingenuity.” This is an example of what was earlier referred to as accretion, namely, expanding a legal 
concept (here, patentable subject matter) so as to make it more inclusive, and what makes such 
accretion possible is the general language of the statute in question: “Whoever invents or discovers 
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title” (35 U.S.C. § 101).  
This generality is something that makes for flexibility, a characteristic earlier discussed as a 
virtue of common law and of the language framing the United States Constitution: that is, precisely the 
background condition enabling the courts to adapt existing law to changing circumstances. The Court 
in this case used such flexibility to effect the accretion just mentioned, and the solution can be 
described as conservative (albeit transformational) in two ways, the first being that no new concepts or 
categories were devised for that purpose, and the second that the Court, in seizing on the flexibility in 
question, was careful to distinguish its own role as interpreter of law from the legislature’s as its 
maker and designer, and as the source to look to when offering an interpretation of law: “Congress 
contemplated that the patent laws should be given wide scope, and the relevant legislative history also 
supports a broad construction.” 
The second of the two cases mentioned involving the patentability of life forms is Harvard 
College v. Canada (2002), involving the so-called OncoMouse, or Harvard Mouse, a lab mouse 
genetically modified to carry a cancer-promoting gene that makes the mouse suitable for cancer 
research by making it significantly more susceptible to cancer than an ordinary mouse. The Court 
acknowledged a “distinction between lower and higher life forms,” a distinction it described as 
“defensible on the basis of [...] common sense” (the OncoMouse belonging with the higher forms), 
and found that a “higher life form is not patentable because it is not a ‘manufacture’ or ‘composition 
of matter’ within the meaning of ‘invention’” in Section 2 of the Canadian Patent Act. The decision 
differs from Diamond in that there is no accretion (no expansion of patentable subject matter, and 
hence no use of any statutory flexibility with regard to patentability) but is similar to that earlier case 
because it, too, can be described as conservative (conservative through and through, for I would not 
also count it as transformational, in the sense of its acting to accrete existing law). Indeed, for one 
thing, what brought the case on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was the Commissioner of 
Patents’ refusal to grant a patent, and even though the Court agreed with the Commissioner that the 
OncoMouse was not patentable, it found that “the Patent Act does not give the Commissioner 
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discretion to refuse a patent on the basis of public policy considerations independent of any express 
provision in the Act.”17 And, for another thing, in very much the same way as in Diamond, the Court 
distinguished its own role from that of the legislature: “Since patenting higher life forms would 
involve a radical departure from the traditional patent regime, and since the patentability of such life 
forms is a highly contentious matter that raises a number of extremely complex issues, clear and 
unequivocal legislation is required for higher life forms to be patentable.” For the same reason, even 
though the Court denied patentability in the case before it, it also found that “neither the 
Commissioner of Patents nor the courts have the authority to declare a moratorium on ‘higher’ life 
patents until Parliament chooses to act.”18 
Diamond and Harvard College both exemplify law’s conservative attitude, its use of old 
bottles to deal with new technologies, whether it be by making extra room for such technologies (in 
Diamond) or by finding that they cannot be fit into existing forms (in Harvard College). This is 
something we can do in these cases because, even though the technology is new, the problem it 
presents can still be framed within the rule. The new technologies can be likened in this respect to 
“traditional subject matter such as novels, movies, and so forth” (Davis et al. 1996, 22), for here, too, 
one should expect issues to arise when it comes to applying intellectual property law. But in all these 
cases “the issue is typically one of fine tuning the rules at the margins, not making the sort of 
fundamental decisions that routinely arise in software cases” (ibid.). Which is to say that where new 
technologies are concerned, we may well face changes so consequential as to make it necessary to 
change the rules themselves (rather than stretch their boundaries), this through what I previously 
called law’s transformative interpretive practice (as distinguished from its transformational practice, 
which still retains a marked conservative pull).  
 
Conclusions 
The framing idea of this paper is that the relation between law, science and technology cannot be 
understood just by looking at law, science and technology themselves: there is nothing inherent in law 
or in science that may be invoked to explain how these two terms of the relation should interact. This 
framing idea is not anything I arrived at by a process of research and discovery: it is rather something 
like a postulate, a view I take to be self-evident. And so it might be asked, given that background: Is 
this entire discussion not pointless and sterile, because we set out to prove what we already knew to be 
the case?  
I respond to this concern by noting that the point of the discussion was not to prove what is 
self-evident but to flesh out in full detail a view that might otherwise be somewhat abstract and 
uninteresting. We all know, for example, that ethics deals with the notions of good and bad (Moore 
1993, 54–55), and that law deals with the rules we all agree to enforce and live by for the sake of our 
own coexistence (Mann and Roberts 2010, 2–3).  These basic definitions and ideas we pretty much 
take as givens. But we equally know that they will not mean much until we explore them in depth and 
make them come alive by considering the specific problems they apply to, and that in part explains 
why so much writing has been devoted to these subjects throughout the course of history.  
That is precisely the kind of endeavor I embarked on in this present inquiry. And that is why 
the relation between law, science and technology needed to be set in a wider context, inclusive of 
elements other than law and science themselves narrowly construed as a system of rules, on the one 
hand, and a system of principles, on the other. In other words, we needed to set this relation in the 
context of society, where we move from the abstract to the concrete, and where nothing can be studied 
in isolation, no matter how amenable it may be to formalization, for this is a context where anything 
                                                     
17 Similarly, in a restatement of the same idea: “The Commissioner of Patents was given no discretion to refuse a patent on 
the grounds of morality, public interest, public order, or any other ground if the statutory criteria are met.” 
18 A court assuming such authority, in other words, would be engaging in so-called judicial activism, a practice that has been 
analyzed as consisting in any of at least five core activities as follows on the part of a court: (1) invalidating what would 
otherwise appear to be constitutional action by another branch of government; (2) departing from precedent or (3) from 
accepted interpretive usage; (4) legislating from the bench; or (5) judging with a view to achieving certain results forming 
part of an agenda (Kmiec 2004). 
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we study, no matter how abstract, inevitably finds itself pulled into the full complexity of human 
affairs, with its web of constantly changing relations. It is this web of relations that we needed to take 
into account in studying the “simpler” relation between law,  science and technology, and in doing so 
we need to selectively bring to light only those relations that matter, or only those factors that pertain 
to the reason why we are studying it to begin with.  
This gives the rationale involved in the three-factor model, but while this rationale provides a 
justification for the model, it also brings out its limitations. Indeed, on the one hand, as we saw a 
moment ago, it would have been an impossible and pointless task to explain the relation between law, 
science and technology by taking into account everything that goes into this relation, but at the same 
time the very selection (the editing) by which to make sense of this relation forces one to leave out 
consideration important factors without which the account itself winds up losing some of its 
explanatory power. 
Thus, while paradigm shifts, socioeconomic consequences, and public debate have been 
selected as the most obvious factors explaining how a technology develops, takes root, and becomes 
the focus of regulation, there is a lot of ground that has not been covered in this account: there are 
factors and relations not considered, and the factors themselves have not been discussed in a fully 
rounded way.  
The reason for these shortcomings is twofold: on the one hand, as was just noted, any attempt 
to take everything into consideration in striving for completeness and objectivity is bound to yield a 
formless, meaningless account; but at the same time, on a more practical note, if I may point the finger 
at the usual culprits, a fuller discussion of the kind I wanted to offer is yet to come because it requires 
more research, research which I plan to do in the future. However, for all these shortcomings, I 
nevertheless hope to have shown a way to discuss a legal question from a cross-disciplinary approach 
capable of affording a broader yet reasoned view of the problem than what a strictly legal investigation 
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